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 h hanks to Elizabeth Anderson for discussing with me some of the contemporary 
problems in the philosophy of science. 
Introduction to Social Science History Roundtable: 
"Does Social Theory Need History?" 
by Margaret R. Somers 
With the founding of the Social Science History Association, a future of 
interdisciplinary encounters between history and the social sciences was 
clearly signalled. The last two decades have seen these encounters 
established in both scholarly and institutional developments. The wide impact 
and the perduring influence of the work of, among others, Barrington Moore, 
Lawrence Stone, Charles Tilly, and Theda Skocpol indicates just how 
intellectually significant these encounters have been in the academic 
community. In the past few years major institutions such as the University of 
Michigan, the University of Minnesota, and New York University have 
established and funded interdisciplinary graduate programs with title's such 
as Michigan's "Comparative Studies in Social Transformation", a program 
coalescing faculty and students from history, sociology, and anthropology. 
But following in the great tradition of Barrington Moore, we must begin 
to ask -- so what? What difference has the interdisciplinary encounter made in 
the approach to knowledge that we bring to our research topics? Has there 
been an epistemological transformation in our thinking about the social world 
as scholars have more boldly begun to transgress the boundaries of the 
traditional disciplines? And perhaps one of the most important questions: How 
significant has historical work been to the recent resurgence of social 
theory? 
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I n  cons ide r ing  these q u e s t i o n s ,  we are lucky  i n  t h a t  one of  t h e  more 
i n t e r e s t i n g  a s p e c t s  of  t h e  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  encoun te r  i s  t h a t  t h e  w r i t i n g s  of 
i t s  l e a d i n g s  s c h o l a r s  have n o t  been conf ined  t o  t h e i r  r e s e a r c h  f i n d i n g s  b u t  
have a l s o  inc luded  numerous r e f l e c t i o n s  and programmatic s t a t e m e n t s  on t h e  
methodologica l  and t h e o r e t c a l  foundat ions  of t h e i r  work. O n e a e e d  on ly  t h i n k  
of  t h e  r e c e n t  deba t e  carried on i n  t h e  pages  o f  t h e  SSHA j o u r n a l  between Theda 
Skocpol and Ol ive r  Zunz concern ing  each o f  t h e i r  r e c e n t s  books, Lawrence 
S t o n e ' s  The Revival  of N a r r a t i v e ,  o r  Charles T i l l y ' s  Big S t r u c t u r e s ,  Large 
P r o c e s s e s ,  Huge Comparisons. 
I n  t h e  s p i r i t  of c o n t i n u i n g  i n  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n  of  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  self-  
consc iousnes s  t h i s  round tab l e  v i l l  address t h e  c u r r e n t  state of t h e  encoun te r  
between h i s t o r y ,  soc io logy ,  and s o c i a l  t h e o r y .  Although each  p a r t i c i p a n t  v i l l  
of c o n r s e  be f r e e  t o  f o c u s  on t h e i r  own area of  i n t e r e s t s ,  some of t h e  g e n e r a l  
q u e s t i o n s  t h e  o r g a n i z e r s  v i l l  pu t  t o  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  i nc lude :  H a s  any 
consensus  been achieved o v e r  whether t h e r e  are c e n t r a l  problems .un i fy ing  t h e  
conce rns  of  t hose  who work a t  t h e  boundar ies  of  o u r  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  
d i s c i p l i n e s ?  What has been t h e  impact of  such  books as Theda S k o c p o l ' s  Vis ion  
and Method i n  H i s t o r i c a l  Soc io logy ,  O l i v e r  Zunz ' s  R e l i v i n g  t h e  P a s t ,  Charles 
T i l l y ' s  Sociology Meet H i s t o r y ,  o r  Ger t rude  Himmelfarb's The New H i s t o r y  and 
t h e  Old? Are t h e  probiems of  each d i s c i p l i n e  s imply  expor t ed  o n t o  new 
t e r r i t o r y  i n  t h e  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  encoun te r ,  o r  does  t h e  merger of  
d i s c i p l i n e s  provide  exp lana to ry  t o o l s  p r e v i o u s l y  u n a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  s i n g l e  
d i s c i p l i n a r y  approach? We w i l l  e s p e c i a l l y  a s k  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  o f f e r  n o t  
o n l y  t h e o r e t i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n s  bu t  a l s o  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  of 
s p e c i f i c  exemplary works, u s i n g  them as p o i n t s  of  r e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e s e  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n s .  
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The participants who have consented to sit at this roundtable are each 
uniquely equipped to take on these issues. Craig Calhoun is a founder of the 
Comparative History section of the American Sociological Association and a 
leading historical sociologist who writes extensively in the area of history, 
anthropology, and social theory. Nick Dirks, a specialist in Indian history, 
has recently published a history of Indian state and civil society formation, 
The Hollow Crobn, and is currently completing a book for Cambridge University 
Press on the relationship of history and anthropology. He is also on the 
steering committee of Michigan's program in the Comparative Study of Social 
Transformation. Barbara Laslett, another leading historical sociologist, is 
! 2:. known for her work in the historical sociology of gender and the social 
1 .* 
reproduction of families. Margaret Somers has written on the relationship of 
history to social theory and on methods of comparative history. She is also a 
, . council member of the American Sociological Association's section on 
comparative history and on the Steering Committee of Michigan's program in the 
Comparative Study of Social Transformations. Arthur Stinchecombe is of course 
one of the country's leading sociologists who is author of Theoretical -~ethods 
in Social History as well as a number of other pieces on the relationship of 
history and sociology. 
Does Social Theory Need History? 
by 
Margaret R. Somers 
What does it mean to ask "Does social theory need history?" What it 
definitely does not mean is "Does sociology need history?" The answer to that 
should be self-evident. Social theory must be the subject for the terrain of 
theory and epistomology dissolves the disciplinary boundaries of history and 
sociology. Nor does the question ask whether historians use or need theory; 
that question also sholud be long settled. The question instead aims to 
explore the historicity, or what I will call the "historical epistomology," of 
that level of theory common to both historians and sociologists -- indeed to 
most social scientists -- and asks what are the implications of this 
epistomology? The term "theory" is conceived in many ways. My use of the 
term is not propositional, but rather limited to the theory embodied in the 
conceptual vocabulary of social and historical discourse -- social class, 
culture, agency tradition, gender, community, social actors, state, and so on. 
There is a dual sense in which this vocabulary is theoretical. Not only are 
each of these concepts theoretical constructions in that they are constructed 
as ideal types; they also contain implicit relational statements. The term 
"community," for example, implies both an ideal typical definition of a 
community as well as assumptions about the relationship between a ([an] ideal 
typical) community and one or more acting subjects. 
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In the last decades a dramatic "historic turn" has flourished across the 
social sciences. As valuable as it has been for scholarship, this turn 
generally has not been epistemologically reflective, tending instead to study 
"the past" and concentrate on~methodologies rather than to explore the 
historicity of the concepts of our trade. But if the historic turn is to mean 
anything more than social science applied to the study of the past through the 
extension of data points, epistemology and the historic turn need each other. 
The task of historicizing our conceptual vocabulary should be the priority of 
the historic turn, and debates over discourse and structure, agency and 
society, class and state, must address the very question of how we have 
constructed and how we continue to use the concepts themselves. These 
constructs of social theory do indeed need history, or more accurately, 
. historical epistemology. We must learn to think historically about our' 
I ,  
theoretical categories as we have begun to do with our empirical problems. 
The "encounter" of the title of the roundtable ("~eflections on the 
epistemological encounters in the social sciences") is thus only marginally 
about the encounter between the disciplines. More fundamentally, it is about 
epistemology and theoretical categories -- or how we construct knowledge. And 
that is a matter that displays a reckless disregard for disciplinary 
boundaries. 
,These remarks are organized to address two current trends in the social 
sciences: 1 .) The wide ranging interest in 'theories of action on the one 
hand, and 2.) the recent backlash among certain sociologists (such as Hechler 
and ~iser) against the work of many leading comparative historical 
sociologists (such as Mann, Moore, Skocpol, Stinchecombe, and ~illy) . I will 
briefly address each of these two trends. 
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the entirety of'academic ire among social social scientists is exercised over 
questions of validity, verification, and justification--lie answers. 
But it is the context of discovery--that context in which we "discover" 
the questions we ask in our research, in which we define that which is 
.-. 
considere8*problematic in the first place (or what is necessary to be 
explained), and in which we select evidence appropriate to formulating that 
question--which is less recognized and less discussed smong sociologists and 
historians. 
My argument today is that social theory needs better questions, and it 
is toward this task that we most need history. 
Why do questions matter so much? Again we learn from the philosophy of 
science that questions are epistemologically prior to answers. There is no 
such thing as an explanation that doesn't contain within it a prior question, 
a problematic; the very language, shape and content of our explanations are 
forged by the questions which inform them. Indeed explanations are only 
called into existence by prior questions. Consider the following historical 
example : 
Charles I1 once invited the members of the Royal Society to 
explain to him why a dead fish weighs more than the same 
fish alive; a number of subtle explanations were offered to 
him. He then pointed out that it doesnt. (~ac~ntyre, 1983, 
p.' 88.) 
And of course we all remember that when Gertrude Stein was asked on her death 
bed "What is the answer?" she replied, "What is the question?" 
Our research agendas--like those of.Charles 11's Royal Society--are not 
shaped by method and data but by the formulation of the problem to be 
explained. 
Where do questions come from and what is their relationship to history? 
Questions come from paradigms. I hope it insults no one to remind you that a 
paradigm is not just a body of methodological principles and strategies, but 
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(in Zeldich's gloss on ~uhn) "a set of concepts and theoretical categories, of 
definitions of problems to be solved, and the criteria for their acceptable 
solution." (p. 277). Because contexts of discovery are "paradigm-laden," it 
is the character of a paradigm that specifies our questions. Michael Polanyi, 
from whom Thomas Kuhn draws much of his inspiration, simplified the notion of 
paradigm by calling it the "tacit knowledge" of social science--that which 
defines the boundaries of normalcy within which the problematics of social 
research operate. 
This is where history comes in. The dangers of normalcy are first that 
it protects and insulates our questions from adequate scrutiny and so allows 
the repeated use of what may be flawed questions. Historical scrutiny is one 
of the scrutinies from which paradigms are protected; paradigms, after all, 
are rooted in "heuristics" (in Lakatos' terminology) and cannot be invalidated 
by history. Social theory is in large part comprised of theorizing about 
contingency and variation. Because only historically,embedded concepts and 
questions can lead to that kind of theorizing, historically embedded concepts 
and questions must be at the heart of social theory. But because they are 
heuristically based, many social science paradigms and their theoretical 
constructs are ideal types. Historians and sociologists who employ these 
constructs willy-nilly fall into the trap of the infamous "fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness" in which abstractions are used as if they are 
historically concrete. Since history inevitably deviates from the ideal 
types, these abstractions produce questions often equally ahistorical and, 
. . 
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paradoxically, framed as problems of deviance from the abstraction. 
This is the second danger of the normalcy of paradigms: Normalcy 
produces "anomalies"--inconvenient empirical counter-examples that appear 
deviant and puzzling when compared to the terms and predictions of paradigms. 
In the land of fairy tales, anomalies junk theories. Were this true, we could 
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have faith in the power of history. But if there's anything the last thirty 
years in the philosophy of science has done it is to demolish the idea that 
science or social science discards theories on the basis of facts. (1t was no 
less than Popper himself who admitted that "ali theories are born refuted.") 
*. 
The real story behind anomalies is that they are the meat and potatoes of 
normalcy; far from refuting theories, inconvenient counter-examples are turned 
into deviant cases and are 1)  explained away by problems of measurement or 
auxiliary hypotheses and 2 )  converted into questions formulated not to ask 
about historical variation but about why history seems to recurrently produce 
cases that deviate from theoretical predictions. Such questions then become 
self-reinforcing for the paradigms and their social categories: When a 
' , Kc- 
variation (and of course that is all that an anomaly really is) is redefined 
i. :.c. 
as anomalous it cannot be used to challenge a theory. 
To suggest that the paraaigms and theoretical constructs driving many of 
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our problematics are abstractions is an assertion controversial enough to 
I .  
deserve a bit of qualification. Very briefly: The founders of classical 
social science (~arx, Weber, ~urkheim) crafted the central postulates of 
modern social theory from their historical rendering of a particular macro- 
historical moment. Built into the heart of social theory is that of the 
putative rupture between "tradition" and "modernity" as it unfolded in Europe 
in the epoch of the industrial revolution. Many of the theoretical concepts 
regarding political institutions and social agency were fashioned from their 
assc.:sment of the centrai human drama of the modernization process, namely the 
cause and consequences of class formations in the same epoch of 
industrialization. These abstracted historical readings were then abstracted 
into a social theory and endowed with generality. 
At the same time, this reading of history was itself the product of the 
newly inherited revolutionary epistemology of the eighteenth century, that of 
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"naturalism"--the optimistic paradigm that politics, philosophy, and moral 
action had been surpassed by the laws of nature and society. The epistemology 
on which the upstart new "science of society" based itself was constructed 
upon two essential rejections of the past: The rejection of a concept of 
human nature that could be construed outside of its individualist 
construction; and the rejection of a concept of society that did not declare 
the subordination of political relations to society's own immanent "laws". 
Modern social theory fused together the postulates of the revolutionary 
epistemology with this historical reading of the modernization of the west. 
The outcome inevitably came to reflect the available analytic discourse of the 
new epistemology. The revolution in social science conceptually reinvented 
the social and political vision of the workings of society. To say that our 
theoretical constructs and paradigms are ahistorical is therefore not to say 
they are not a product of history. Rather it is to say that deconstructing 
those constructs leads to the discovery of a particular rendering of history 
embedded within their ideal typologies. 
If these large propositions make any sense, it follows that the much 
needed project of theoretical renewal is at once an historical project-- 
neither can be accomplished in isolation. To accomplish the theoretical task 
requires a reconsideration of many of the same historical processes that are 
frozen into modern social theory, just as the historical task requires a new 
conceptual frame of reference that can Only be developed by reflecting on the 
problematic nature of the assumptions underlying classical social theory. 
. .t: n 
Historians and sociologists alike therefore need to subject our 
questions, and the social categories which constitute their vocabulary, to 
historical inquiry.' This can be done by subjecting the questions to 1) the 
discipline of comparative concreteness--by which I mean the conversion of 
questions of anomolousness or deviance into questions of historical variation; 
1 1  
and 2) the discipline of historical specificity--by which I mean grounding our 
questions and. categories in time and space. Both disciplines are designed to 
combat .the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. 
Let me give an example of how the first has been done in a few cases 
dealing with social agency. The first comes from gender studies. For years 
scholars of moral development pondered the seemingly unanswerable question of 
why women do not achieve the highest stages of development allegedly achieved 
by men. Why are women deviant or marginal, social scientists and social 
historians alike have asked? More specifically, they ask why is it that while 
men develop according to the correct theoretical norm, becoming increasingly 
autonomous, individuated, and oriented to rules of abstract justice, women get 
stuck at a regressed stage where they are tied primarily to their social 
relationships and make political and moral decisions Sased on principles of 
equity and relationality rather than autonomy. As we know, social scientists 
and historians have invented inumerable explanations for why women do not live 
up to the male paradigm. 
Carol Gilligan did something different. She did not ask yet once again 
what is wrong with women; instead she asked what is wrong with a paradigm 
whose central problematic generates qaestions primarily about women's deviant 
and marginal agency. She did so by subjecting the abstraction of agency to 
comparative concreteness and thus turned the quesion into one of concrete - 
variation. Male and female actions were compared not against the ideal type 
of individuation, but against each other's own practices. She then produced a 
new question: How do we explain gender-varied processes of development? and so 
turned theories of moral development on their heads. 
Because Gilligan's argument is both ahistorical and essentialist, I 
would opt instead for the more post-structural concept of identity developed 
by Joan Scott (1988.) Nonetheless, it is still important to note' that the 
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gendered concept of agency as it was used before Gilligan was an abstraction 
used as if it refered to an historically specific agent. Counter examples 
only produced questions about deviance, rather than about variation, and so 
precluded the historicization of the concept of agency. 
One could take the point even further and argue that the entire 
problematic of agency and structure is premised on the idea that people are 
constituted first as abstract individuals and then enter into relationships 
with their social world. The abstraction is Well represented in the 
prevailing problematic of agency and Structure: If agents are constrained by 
structure, how do they come to act? And if they can indeed act, how are they 
constrained? The question presumes an antinomy between the actors and the 
structure of social relationships in which they are acting. But if identity 
was in fact defined by those historically situated relations, the entire 
problematic would be a false one--not unlike Charles' dead fish. This is only 
something that can be discovered by calling the construct of agency out of the 
realm of tacit knowledge and into the realm of historical inquiry. 
One way to do so is to look at the concept of agency which emerged from 
the making of modern social theory described above--a concept shorn of social 
connectedness and moral agency in favour of autonomy and interest. As each of 
the conceptual principles of the new epistemology declared an irrevocable 
break between tradition and the modern world, continuities and connections 
could not be theoretically accomodated as other than cases of failed progress. 
The conceptual liberation from the past relegated any signs of tradition to - .,
the oppression of the dead. People were detached from their historicity and 
made and remade by the endless momentum of changing social conditions. In 
this "revolutionary idiom" of the subject, only the negative actions of 
"freedom from..."--from others, from politics, from constraint--fitted the 
modern actor. The modern view of community solidarity followed accordingly. 
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Communities were the stuff of romantic--and dangerously reactionary--visions 
of Gemeinschaft where the newly liberated self potentially would be subjected 
to the tyranny of the group. Small wonder that these theoretical principles 
central to modern social theory cannot explain those dimensions of social life 
. - 
that were excluded by the classical interpretation, namely continuities and 
connectiveness in social agency. 
It is the prior acceptance of these assumptions in social theory that 
explains why that which is considered problematic for sociological inquiry is 
the "irrational", "conservative",, and "anachronistic" behavior of those 
people--usually women and the working classes--who fail to conform to the 
proper standards of the revolutionary idiom's rejection of ontological 
connectedness in favour of an abstract autonomy and "freedom from...'' 
A second example of how history could better inform question-formation 
comes from theories of social class. Rather than seeking to explain events 
and processes that are or have been, more commonly have sought to explain what 
is not or has not been the problematics of class formation, namely class 
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consciousness among the Western working class. At the heart of the problem is 
Marx's "class in itself-for itself" problematic--an ideal typical and thus 
abstract formulation which predicts the emergence of a working class 
revolutionary consciousness from capitalism's class structure. Numerous 
problems--conceptual, methodological, and explanatory--have followed. By 
class do we mean only objective class position, or should the definition 
include soc.i.r?,l action? If a unitary capitalist development is the causal a 
priori of class development, how are we to explain variation among working 
classes? 
But of all the problems generated by this prediction, none has been 
greater than the "failure" of the western working class to behave correctly. 
The results of this failure are striking: Rather than a rich literature 
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explaining variations among working class histories, countless explanations 
can be found for why any given working class "deviated" from the prediction. 
Surely it is time to ask some new and critical questions: Why is it that the 
standard problem to be explained in class analysis is how to explain not what 
is or has been empirically present, but rather the failure of a people to 
behave correctly according to a theoretical prediction? Why are studies of 
class formation rooted in an epistemology of absence? 
The answer lies in the agent of class theory. It presupposes that 
agents are constituted first in relationship to "making1' and social 
production, and then (in the heuristic sense of then) enter into social 
relationships. From this abstract presupposition it follows logically that 
the central political problematic in analyses of class formation is that of 
the transition from the first "objective" positionality of class to the second 
"relational" or collective moment of class action. From a different premise, 
it is the same problematic as that posed by rational choice theory, namely how 
to account for counter-examples to.the free rider option in social action. 
One recent approach in historical sociology replaces the abstract 
category of class with a relational or network approach to political identity 
(Bearman, forthcoming). This approach reframes class as a set of concrete 
relationships grounded in time and space, and shaped by the relationships and 
networks among the actors themselves. The advantage of this for a theory of 
class formation is notable: Because patterns of relationality are already 
incorporated into the constitution of the agent of social class, the age-old 
a?. 
problematic of how classes move from class structure to social solidarity is 
bypassed. 
Another approach, exemplified by Katznelson's and Zolberg's recent 
Working-Class Formation (1986), is to challenge the ahistoricism of the ideal 
typical prediction--the teleology of development from class structure to 
15 
political action. By instead subjecting the problem to the discipline of 
comparative concreteness--namely, asking why did each pattern of working class 
formation vary from each other, and not from an abstract prediction--they 
transformed the prevailing problematic of exceptionalism and deviance in class 
formation into a different question.. This made possible an entirely different 
answer. 
And of course, the same points could and should.be made about the 
questions we ask about structure using the concepts of bureaucracy, states, 
communities, etc. For years, for example, political sociologists have asked 
why England's development produced a political bureaucracy so deviant from the 
Weberian ideal-typical model we've all come to accept as the standard against 
which to judge "strong" and "weak" states. But when we compare the actual 
workings of England's bureaucracy against the French--not just as ideal types 
but as historically embedded structures--we discover not that England deviates 
from a "true" bureaucracy (a deviancy then necessary to problematize) but that 
the states worked differently in each case. And it is those differences that 
become interesting only once we have discardsd the fallacy of the misplaced 
abstraction. 
An example of the second discipline I mentioned above--suSjecting our 
questions to the discipline of historical specificity (their grounding in time 
and space)--is drawn from my own research (~omers, 1986). I began my research 
into English working-class formation with an inherited question: What was it 
about the industrial revolution that led nineteenth-century English work,ers to 
carry out the kinds of political practices and protests that they did? The 
literature is rich with answers to this question, all of which presuppose the 
industrial revolution to be the causal element in the explanation for the 
social practices of working people. For background I read widely in the 
literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Much to my surprise I 
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found evidence for the presence of much of the same social discourse of 
protest and many of the same political practices. Discovering also the 
regional distribution of an early industrial labour market, I devised a new 
question asking what was it about the intrusion of early rural-industrial 
markets that could explain these earlier working-class activities. Again 
interested in background, I turned to the fourteenth century. Most striking 
of all, I found that peasant communities (in the same limited regions as in 
the later periods) articulated their social and political practices in 
language and action remarkably similar to those of their nineteenth-century 
descendants. In the fourteenth century, however, there was no industrial 
labour market. By now it had become clear that an entirely new question was 
in order, one which firmly detached the problem to be explained from the 
presuppositions of economic and market influence and reframed it in terms of 
actual (rather than paradigmatic) temporalities and spatial distributions. 
Thus my new question: How.are we to understand such continuities and regional 
contrasts in popular practices for over five centuries--despite the radical 
economic changes and the transition from feudalism to capitalism to the 
industrial revolution? The original question--drawn from the abstractions of 
modernization theory with its fixation on the industrial revolution--contained 
misleading assumptions about time and space; subjecting the question to the 
discipline of historical specificity produced a surprisingly different, but 
hopefully more historically grounded, problem. 
Let me briefly move to the second trend I mentioned in the beginning: 
The backlash against history from some sociologists who claim that social 
theory is suffering from what they call the empiricist and historicist methods 
of many of our leading historical sociologists. The attack, led by Michael 
Hechter and Edgar Kiser, among others, is directed at what Skocpol has called 
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"analytic inductivism," the method of building arguments from historical 
research using only loosely organized concepts, rather than conducting 
research through the hypothetical-deductive (h/d) method of testing theories. 
The attack is similarly aimed at Stinchecombe's use of historical analogy and 
M. Mann's interpretive approach. Hechter argues that only the theory-driven 
h/d method can produce the kind of social theory needed in historical 
sociology, namely general theory which can equally predict the future and 
explain the past--that which in science is called the covering law model of 
theory. 
Fresumably it is unnecessary in this audience to defend the use of 
history. Instead I'ld like to play the devil's advocate and address Hechter's 
anti-history argument about social theory. Suppose we all agree that 
sociology and history are both sciences; what kind of models does science 
actually provide for theory-building? 
If we begin with physics, the "queen of the sciences," we discover that 
in recent years analyses of its workings have changed considerably. For one, 
the age-old deductivist bias in the philosophy of science (from Popper to 
~akatos) is no longer a consensus. This bias had it that scientific work is 
only theory-driven and that the purpose of for observation is to test pre- 
existing theories and hypotheses. This hypothetical-deductive method alone, 
the argument continues, is the source of the production of new theory through 
the falsification of theory by data. "People propose, data dispose" is the 
fairy-tale version af the story. 
Hechter and Kiser should have looked at the history--not the philosophy- 
-of actual scientific practice instead of merely repeating the h/d bias. In 
last ten years the purely deductive version of science has come unravelled 
from new perspectives on scientific practice. These demonstrate that the 
relative import of theory-driven data testing has been radically exaggerated. 
Science reveals many avenues to pathbreaking knowledge: testing theories by 
observing only those phenomena designated by a pre-existing hypothesis is only 
one of them. Observation, very much like the role of analytic induction in 
historical sociology, has a life of its own independent of the h/d model of 
conducting research. This is not to say that those who observe are engaged in 
mindless empiricism. They bring to their observations the same kinds of 
controlled theoretical constructs and limited theoretical concepts Hechter and 
Kiser condemn comparative historical sociologicst for employing. Analytic 
.induction is theory-building driven by history and observation, not by pure 
' deduction. 
Consider the classic case of the big bang,theory. In one laboratory 
Penzio and Wilson, two radio astronomers, .experimented on what they were 
afraid might be a meaningless phenomenon but which held intrinsic interest to 
them--the static found in transatlantic radio. After considerable 
experimentaion, they determined that there was a uniform amount of energy in 
space. Meanwhile, physicists at Bell Labs were theorizing about what came to 
be called the big bang theory. Only the discovery of the experimental tests-- 
conducted utterly independently of any hypotheses about the origins of the 
earth--could confirm the theorists' speculation of a uniform temperature 
throughout space. They found it in the work of Penzio and Wilson. If science 
had proceeded the way Hechter and Kiser advocate we would have many less 
theories about the physical world. Should we have lesser aims for historical 
work? 
The second revision in physics is equally important and addresses the 
nature of theory and historical narrative. Hechter and Kiser attack 
historical sociologists for not being concerned enough with the production of 
"general theory" which can explain the nature of the causal mechanisms by 
which empirical phenomena are generated. In the name of true science, they 
19 
lambast historical sociologists for not producing theory that is universal 
enough in scope and "bold" enough in its propositions to be able to predict 
the future and explain the present in the same way the past is causally 
explained. 
But scientific practice once again poses a challenge. In physics the 
assumption that the fundamental covering laws of general theory can both 
predict and offer causal explanation has recently begun to unravel. It is now 
questioned whether a single theory can combine covering laws with explanations 
of actual causal mechanisms. Explanation in physics involves two different 
kinds of activities and two different tasks. First, when scientists explain a 
phenomenon or class of phenomena, they state its causes. They provide 
-11. 
X " 
detailed accounts of the causal mechanisms by which the phenomena are 
. .B 
produced. Second, they try to fit these phenomena into a Sroad theoretical 
framework whcih brings together, under one set of fundamental equations, a 
., : 0.:: 
wide array of different kinds of phenomena. Both kinds of explanations use 
A. 
what philosophers have called laws of nature, but the two aspects of theory do 
not look at all alike. 
The causal story is just that--a story that uses highly specific 
accounts which tell what happens in concrete situations. In contrast, 
covering laws are throroughly abstract formulae which describe no particular 
circumstances at all. This is evident in the respective rules for the two 
types of accounts. Competing theoretical treatments--treatments which offer 
different general laws for the same phenomena--are encouraged in physics. By 
contrast, only a single causal story is allowed. Causal stories do not tell 
first one causal story then another according to their convenience. Causal 
stories are treated as if they are true or false, but which fundamental 
theories govern the phinomena is a matter of convenience (e.g. there are 
dozens of fundamental theorems for laser operations and scientists openly 
2 0 
choose one or another depending on other factors. And not surprisingly, 
although philosophers generally believe.in laws and deny causes, because of 
the specificity of causal stories actual practice in physics works in just the 
reverse. 
Let's take a classic example from economic theory. The fundamental law 
is based on microeconomic theory and it purports to explain how firms make 
decisions about prices: Because they are motivated to maximize profits, 
managers determine prices by setting output at level where marginal costs and 
marginal revenues are equal. This may work as a powerful predictor about a 
relationship between managers and prices but it certainly doesn't give us an 
explanation for how prices are set. Why not? - Because it is undisputed in 
economics that no manager or any economist has the slightest idea of what the 
marginal cost of producing something is. For a cause to explain, the cause 
really has to exist; it has to be identified and exhibited. An "as if" 
underlying theory is not a cause, it exhibits no evidence. No less than 
Milton Friedman has admitted that the actual thought processes of managers 
cannot in practice resemble this model. We have a covering law but we don't 
have a causal explanation. 
The conventional h/d account claims that we have explained a phenomenon 
when we have shown how it follows from a more fundamental law. But a real 
explanation in fact cannot fit under a fundamental law for its necessary 
detail and complexity contradicts the h/d method's aims of extending the scope 
and universality of theory. Fundamental laws do not govern objects in reality; 
-- .P - Y .  
they govern only objects in models. What they govern has only the appearance 
of reality and the appearance is far tidier and more readily regimented than 
reality itself. Reality demands causal stories. Generality and causality 
cannot be contained in a single theoretical utterance. The historicity of 
causality precludes their co-existence. 
2 1 
Since causality, unlike generality, involves "stories", it is also the 
historicity of the causal explanation that is equally relevant for the defense 
of history against the attacks of the general theorists. Take an example with 
which we are all familiar: It is a general covering law that to lose weight, 
- - 
you have to eat less. This suggests causal mechanisms--eating less causes the 
effect of losing weight--and it may also be a powerful predictor, but it 
doesn't in fact explain tile mechanism of how that actually happens. The 
statement doesn't exhibit a cause. How do we exhibit a cause? We tell a 
story, a narrative about how a class of events is actually affected by 
something else. Since food has calories, and calories are energy, when we 
reduce our intake then the body has less energy to draw from external sources 
so it has to turn to internal sources of energy, which are stores of fat and 
it uses up fat when it draws that energy, etc. etc. Along the way we may use 
general laws but they aren't in themselves explanations for why, when we eat 
less, we lose weight. 
The moral of this story is that in science as well as sociology, an 
explanation which actually depicts causal mechanisms is always told in 
narrative form. It is a set of sentences with transitive verbs. "The 
reduction of energy caused the body to draw on other sources..." "A actually 
caused B to happen by means of the following mechanisms and processes ..." 
Cause implies narrative. The historical and temporal dimension of comparative 
history is thus as important as its comparative component for it entails 
explantory narrative. It i.s narrative because the explantion is embedded in 
time, and moves through time. Indeed the success of any explanation resides . 
in its accounting for temporality, sequence and contingency. The explanatory 
narrative, if effectively argued, should produce an explanation through the 
historical trajectory itself. 
Conclusion 
First the obvious: The "historic turn" in science is making it 
impossible for anti-historians to play the science card any more. If 
sociology and history are sciences (or perhaps what my my colleague Mayer Zald 
(1988) has recently called "quasi-sciences") and must live up to scientific 
standards, historical sociologists are using scientific methodology no less 
than are those advocates of the h/d model of social theory. Historical 
sociologists by and large are interested in explaining patterns over time and 
space. Just as in physics, once too great a degree of geqerality has been 
introduced, we are no longer producing actual causal stories but abstract 
propositions. How, for example, a revolution occurred in one place and not 
another, cannot be explained by covering laws. Historical sociologists have 
set themselves a different task than general theorists and philosophers are 
now aware that the same division of labour exists in scientific practice. The 
same theories in physics cannot not do both: they cannot give a general 
covering law and a causal statement in the same statement. We can no longer 
simply subsume one under the other and claim that same task is being 
performed. 
Since historical sociologists are largely interested in generating 
social theory by explaining patterns and variations over time, we have an 
interest in avoiding exactly the kind of general theory that Hechter and the 
anti-historians advocate. Indeed the lesson from physics is that a high 
degree of generality and actual causal stories about the past cannot be 
combined in a single theory. Theory, it appears, is eitheb historically 
f 
grounded or abstractly general. It cannot be both. 
But no less important is the lesson that physics provides on the role of 
historical narrative in the process of generating theory. If the grand 
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theorists of physics now recognize the sine qua non of historical narrative, I 
ask the same question as above, should we ask anything less for social theory? 
So when we ask, does social theory need history? The answer must be a 
resounding yes--because our work is rich with unexamined and ahistorical 
constructs which are organizing the questions of our social research. Many of 
the social categories we all use--historians and sociologists alike--are free- 
floating pieces and fragments of abstractions and paradigms. If we continue 
to use these to formulate questions, we will continue to produce not 
explanations for historical variation but increasingly desperate theories of 
deviance from the abstractions that pass as theory. History can no longer be 
taken as the "context" and the "background chapter" for social research and 
.i+&-. 
social theory. Attention to the context of discovery makes it clear that it 
..a 
is no longer adequate to say that history enhances our social theories. It is 
time to recognize that without an historical epistemology, we actually get our 
'-.A. .- 
questions, and thus our answers, wrong. 
.? 
To solve the problems of theory we need more historical deconstruction 
of social categories, of the theoretical problematics that are embeddee in 
historical ones, and of the contexts in which they are discovered. This is 
not a plea for empiricism; on the contrary, the high ground on which we all 
meet is that of theory and ultimately epistemology, and the highest grandeur 
one can endow to epistemology is historical specificity. 
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